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As George Orwell. Herbert Marcuse and. more recently. John Ralston 
Saul have argued. language can be a key mechanism whereby social 
reality is blurred. camouflaged or distorted (Orwell 1957: 143-57; 
MarcuseI972: 78-103; Saul 1997: 41-75). Slogans. buzzwords and 
words blatantly misused permeate contemporary discourse. Just as 
the advertising industry can take a word like 'freedom' and render it a 
commodity. so too politicians and journalists can take a word like 
'reform; and strip it ofmeaning. We are told. for example, of the reforms 
of the Kennett government in Victoria. Closing hospitals and schools 
and wrecking the industrial relations system somehow count as 
:reforms'. If something is about to undergo a reform process, as likely 
as not this means it will be gutted financially. And it is always the 
institutions of our public sphere being 'reformed', because the public 
sphere is painted as full of waste and sloth, draining the taxpayers' 
money. The private-whether private industry or private schools-are 
by contrast efficient operating machines always giving value. This is 
the language of the New Right but it has become commonsense discourse 
today trotted out by journalists. politicians and denizens of pubs alike. 
The problem some revitalized radical movement in Australia faces is in 
part a problem of finding a language which gives recognition to the 
strengths of the public sphere and, indeed, positively elevates the public 
over the private. Here a paradox emerges-large sections of the Left. 
particularly those bound up with identity politics, have focused on the 
virtues of the private sphere. Now while the meaning they attach to 
this is, of course, different from the New Right. it does reinforce aspects 
of New-Right ideology. What Christopher Lasch called 'the culture of 
129 
130 131 Anthony Ashbolt 
narcissism' has a strange way of drawing the Right and Left together to 
celebrate a world devoid of public responsibilities, a world in which the 
private and privacy are virtuous and liberating (Lasch 1978; Saul 1977: 
162-3). The campaign againstthe Australia Card on the grounds of the 
protection of privacy is but one example of this. So, too, is the campaign 
against Tasmania's former draconian sexual laws (no more draconian 
than many American states but you would have thought otherwise 
given the tenor of the protests). it was left up to a few moral conservatives 
to point out that the push for absolute privacy rights in this instance 
could lead to the denial of the rights of women and children. 
Swimming against the tide, Stanley Fish has proclaimed that 'there 
is no such thing as free speech' (Fish 1994). Speech always takes place 
under specific social conditions and circumstances which limit it 
intrinsically to some degree. In the same way, there is no such thing as 
an absolute right to privacy. Instead, rights are circumscribed by other 
rights, by social conventions, by public morality. The idea of public 
morality seems almost censorious and is surely guaranteed to take the 
life out of every jolly (if not gay) event. What is it and how can one 
determine its boundaries, and, perhaps more importantly, who defines 
its nature? These are important questions but too often the ground is 
taken away from so-called Left and progressive forces because the New 
Right and moral fundamentalists address the issue clearly. For them 
the answer is simple, indeed total. The Left, meanwhile and perhaps 
understandably, goes off in all directions, defending free expression 
one moment and seeking to protect children the neJ..'t, proclaiming 
absolute freedom while circumscribing certain behaviour; upholding 
free speech at the same time as defending racial vilification laws. This 
is not necessarily contradictory but nor is it worked out carefully. Rights 
invariably come into conflict and a delicate balancing act is required if 
we are to simultaneously avoid the private absolutism ofAmerican first 
amendment protections and the public absolUtism of moral funda­
mentalists. Public morality is not synonymous with public absolutism. 
Rather, it refers to that complex web of values. ethics, behaViour and 
sentiment which gives strength to a public realm, and which bolsters it 
against the onslaught of private profit and individual greed. it signals 
collective beliefs which transcend but do not necessarily destroy private 
desires. And the world of the public is not simply one of austere 
adherence to a rigid set of doctrines, of behavioural codes which strait­
jacket individual expression. Instead, it can and should be seen as a 
potential site of resistance to authoritarianism, the foundation of social 
good, the wellspring of human contentment (Habermas 1974: 49-56). 
This is a very different view of 'public' from that being propagated today. 
There is such a thing as society and there are such things as public 
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pleasures. The task is to fight against an increaSingly privatized world 
in which all sense of collective endeavour, social cohesion and public 
satisfaction is increasingly dissipated. 
All this is not to suggest that the public sphere invariably succeeds 
at its tasks, nor is it to imply that there is nothing of worth in the 
private sphere (whether we take that to mean our individual worlds or 
the realm of private corporations). Rather, it is to acknowledge the 
necessity of the public sphere as a buffer against the worst excesses of 
the private, as an arena to some degree protected from deregulated 
private behaviour whether it be that in the marketplace or in the home. 
The paradox of market deregulation is that far from leading to a break­
out of private competition, it invariably strengthens oligopoly. 
Deregulating behaviour in the bedroom is by no means a bad thing 
(between consenting adults). but let us not see it as deregulation nor 
as private rights but rather as public rights to be pursued in a private 
domain. The central question today, however, does not concern rights 
.in the bedroom (which might not. in particular places and at particular 
times, be peripheral). The crux of the matter concerns people's rights 
to public institutions like schools and universities, and broadcasting 
media which are not subject to the dictates of some imaginary market 
manipulated by moguls millions of miles away. 
We do live in confusing times and that confusion is highlighted in 
sometimes mysterious ways. Film reviewer Margaret Pomerantz recently 
had this to say: 'I'm thinking of moving to New Zealand. I don't like the 
way this country is gOing. Everything is regulated. I hate rules. Where 
are the rebels? What are the university students doing about it? They're 
protesting about higher fees for godsakes' (Pomerantz 1996). Well, no 
.,. they're also protesting about the privatization and deregulation of 
our universities. And they know that deregulation and authoritarian 
(as well as banal) managerial administrative practice go hand in hand. 
So there is a paradox and perhaps it's this which so befuddles 
Pomerantz-deregulation only removes certain rules; other rules, even 
more rigid and inflexible, take their place. But, of course, Pomerantz 
can hardly be accused of knowing anything about politics. British 
socialist feminist Beatrix Campbell, reflecting the despairing tone of 
the British Left, reveals a different kind of confusion. Railing against 
pro-family and pro-community rhetoric, she appears to seek final solace 
in Princess OJ's 'struggle' against Charles: .... the daughters of the royal 
family are now calling its men to account and expOSing the patriarchal 
behaviOur of princes' (Campbell 1996: 26). So, fooled by the patriarchal 
logic of appeals to family, neighbourhood and community, perhaps the 
Left lost sight of the fact that the class struggle has shifted ground so 
dramatically it is now an aristocratic parlour game. But possibly that's 
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not what Campbell means-possibly, quite possibly, It Is all utterly 
meaningless. And that again is the problem with language and with 
words today. Signifier and signified have parted ways: but I would argue 
that this reflects the success of capital which always. as Marx so 
brilliantly explained, functions almost magically, abstractly, until we 
finally realize that '[ulnder the ideal measure of values there lurks the 
hard cash' (Marx 1906: 116). 
Words come easily to Eric Hobsbawm and he ushers back 'the nation' 
in his call for a change in Left direction (Hobsbawm 1996: 45). And 
why not? Nothing else seems to be working, so what harm could a good 
old dose of patriotism do? And In a truly obseqUious piece about the 
Australian Prime Minister, Michelle Grattan reveals that John Howard 
has just started Christopher Lasch's last book The Revolt oj the Elites 
and the Betrayal qfDemocracy (Grattan 1996: 66-73: Lasch 1995). No 
doubt he will find in that book an endorsement of his policies, a critique 
of government and social-welfare liberalism, a defence of family and 
community, a dismissal of the new social movements as produCts of 
the professional-managerial class. The Left has rarely understood Lasch, 
so why would we expect the Right to? There is much conservatism in 
Lasch's analysis, much populism which runs the risk of being seen as 
patriarchal and authoritarian. But there is also much good sense, Take 
the following passage: 
To an alarming extent the privileged classes-by an expansive 
definition, the top 20 percent-have made themselves Independent 
not only of crumbling Industrial cities but of public services In 
general. They send their children to private schools, insure 
themselves against medical emergencies by enrolling In company­
supported plans. and hire private security guards to protect 
themselves against the mounting violence against them. In effect. 
they have removed themselves from the common life (Lasch 1995: 
45). 
But then he beats a retreat into middle-class nationalism because' 
It supposedly provided 'a common ground, a common frame of reference' 
(Lasch 1995: 48-9). And one can see Howard's head nodding vigorously. 
Our Prime Minister will, no doubt. ignore the fact that much of the 
book is a passionate defence of the public sphere over the private sphere, 
of democracy over finance capital, of community and neighbourhood 
over increasingly privatized liVing. Howard will get from It what he wants 
to get from it-a defence of ordinary people and their values (ordinary 
people defined by their non-membership of the policy elite!. a defence 
of the common folk and their way of life moulded by family, church and 
safe neighbourhoods. Just as Robert Hughes, Arthur Schlesinger Jnr 
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and even Todd Gitlin tend to exaggerate the once common thread 
underpinning American life so, too, Lasch's ordinary person and 
common folk are idealized mythologies (Hughes 1993: Schlesinger Jnr; 
1992: Gitlin 1995; Ashbolt 1994). Yet. to some degree, they are 
indispensable mythologies precisely because we must identify the ties 
that bind. The public sphere cannot be reduced to a factional 
battleground (Lasch 1995: 49). Yet neither can difference be obliterated. 
The point is to create a public sphere in which both difference and 
commonality can flourish. 
Mckenzie Wark, like so many erstwhile Leftist inverse snobs, Invokes 
ordinary people to attack the pretensions of the intellectual elite. He 
waxes lyrical about the talk-show genre (Donahue, Winfrey et al.) 
because they 'do deal with serious social and political issues, but they 
do so in ways that most ordinary people can understand' (Wark 1996: 
43). There Is something very ordinary about this sort of argument. This, 
after all, Is the genre which Watergate reporter Carl Bernstein called 
'the Idiot culture': Today ordinary people are being stuffed with garbage: 
by freak shows, by Hard Copy, by newscasts that do special segments 
devoted to hyping hype' (Bernstein 1992). What contemptfor ordinary 
people Bernstein possesses. Perhaps, instead. we should listen to Wark's 
words of wisdom: .... regular 1V watchers are often smarter 1V viewers 
than arrogant Intellectuals' (Wark 1996: 44). This proposition reeks of 
arrogance itself. Many intellectuals, so the story goes, simply have not 
adjusted to the post-literate age. Wark himself has adjusted quite well 
and may, Indeed, be a virtual television set. He believes in public 
broadcasting but also has faith in what ordinary people want and that. 
of course, is the schlock of commercial television. The problem he is 
trying to identify is how to build a culture of resistance to cuts in arts 
and public broadcasting. His answer is to inhabit the world of mass 
culture, to absorb its signs and messages, to comprehend 'the 
contemporary matrix of media vectors and the kinds of publics that 
can form there and form their views there' (Wark 1996: 45). This is not 
simply confusion but utter nonsense. It is a defence of the private sphere 
disgUised, almost cleverly, as a defence of the public sphere. Similarly, 
the championing of the ordinary person ends up in barracklng for 
advertisers. 
In its search for a new language, new modes of communication, the 
Left cannot simply adopt the framework of the New Right as that 
framework itself has been erect.ed to serve the interests of capital. Even 
the term 'social capital', used continually by Eva Cox in her passionate 
defence of the public sphere, is too bound up with market logic. too 
much within the frames of bourgeois discourse, too easily be 
appropriated by private-sphere apologists (Cox 1995). That. of course, 
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can be a problem for any term used by the Left. So much of what the 
New Right has done and is doing is dressed up in the language of 
community or local power. Just as Reagan stole the 'No more Vietnam' 
slogan from the peace movement and New-Right ideologues stole the 
once ironic term 'political correctness' from the Left, they have managed 
to appropriate the language of community power for the purposes of 
dismantling the public sphere. Concepts of choice and parental control 
are at the centre of New-Right attempts to further privatize the school 
system; giving back to people a power which the evil state bureaucracy 
and teachers' unions had taken away. It all sounds like benign populism 
and pluralism but It is designed to reinforce market dictates and private 
desires. Once again, language has intervened to disguise what 
constitutes a savage attack on the public sphere. This is truly a 
postmodern politics where the signifier and signified bear absolutely 
no relation to one another. Democratic choice, so it seems, has preVailed. 
Yet, in reality, the rapid erosion of both meaning and substantive 
democracy proceeds apace. 
When the New Right has appropriated terms which might once have 
had Left-liberal connotations, how then can we revive a spirited public 
sphere without obliterating notions of choice, difference, identity, and 
flexibility? The twilight of common dreams', to use Todd Gitlin's phrase, 
is a matter of great concern (Gitlin 1995). Nonetheless, the point is not 
to bury or obliterate difference but to accommodate it within an overall 
framework of solidarity, collective thought and action, over-arching goals 
rather than particular concessions (even though these can be important). ,ki'"
As Gitlin argues, 'the cultivation of separate identities is myopic for the 
Left above all' (Gitlin 1995: 231). But he fails to locate the origins of 
this cultivation within the dynamic of contemporary capitalism and its 
Simultaneous dependence upon conformity and difference. This, after 
all, is what identity politics is all about-difference within conformity. 
Admittedly, the prospects of a collective consciousness which 
embraces disparate groupings and sensibilities are remote. As 
postmodernity propels the fragmentation of life, so, too, it assists the 
fragmentation of social protest. Rights collide with each other, fractUring 
whatever unity might have been possible. Fixation upon identity breeds 
a self-conscious solipsism. Issues multiply and a clear focus gets lost. 
The battle is over fragments, never the whole. Such is the dynamic of 
postmodernist thought which perceives totalitarianism lurking behind 
any concept of 'the whole'. Postmodernism is, after all, just another 
variety of pluralism dressed up in identity-kit garments. Paradoxically, 
this has not meant the transcendence of correct-lineism. On the 
contrary, correct lines multiply along with issues and it becomes difficult 
to keep up with the latest ideological fashions. Identity brand names 
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claim doting allegiance-one moment gay, the next queer, the next post­
feminist and so on, until the labels themselves, stripped of authenticity, 
are attached to simulated lifestyles. And it might well be argued that a 
Simulated lifestyle is better than none at all in a postmodern world, 
and who is Left (as it were) who could disagree with that? 
Despite the weaknesses which flow from identity politics, it can 
also be a source of great strength, a moment of resistance to a culture 
of conformity which still claims much allegiance. While the market­
place of contemporary capitalism reverberates with postmodern choices, 
there is still a residual bland authoritarian cultural predisposition which 
reasserts itself from time to time. It is not, after all, as if the Left 
(multicultural or otherwise) has won any but the most marginal of 
battles, and even where it has emerged victorious over affirmative action 
or quotas or speech codes on campus, the significance of the victories 
is exaggerated. Moreover, such 'gains' tend to serve the interests of 
bureaucratic elites more than those of the downtrodden and excluded. 
There is a tension within identity politics-a pull between the desire for 
a certain type of community and a retreat into self. Jenny Bourne has 
referred to 'the homelands of the mind' characterizing Zionist feminism 
and this phrase seems appropriate for identity politics in general. 
wherein community takes on an increasingly imaginary role displaced 
from concrete social conditions (Bourne 1987). For instance, the gay 
community refers only sometimes to place and when it refers to 
something other than place it loses its resonance. One of the problems 
is that 'identity' is not the preserve of supposedly Leftist or progressive 
forces. Rather, contemporary capitalism has produced a crisis (for want 
of a better term) in subjectivity, and identity politics is a response to 
this crisis, or perhaps a retreat from this crisis into 'homelands of the 
mind'. One homeland increasingly apparent in America is 'whiteness' 
and so, too, within America and Australia the middle-class middle­
aged male is emerging as a beleaguered, marginalized, downtrodden 
species in need of an identity by-pass (Bendersk 1995: 135-57). ThiS 
would be funny if it was not so dangerous and it does tend to support 
Michael Lind's contention that the multicultural Left and sections of 
the Right could find common ground in the sphere of identity politics 
(Lind 1995: 254). 
Identity is not unimportant. Personal life should be a concern of 
the Left. But when a politics of subjectivity (to use Russel Jacoby's 
phrase) fuels the project of social transformation, this necessarily 
truncates the vision of the Left (Jacoby 1975: 101-18). Indeed, as L.A. 
Kaufman has suggested, that vision (and the struggle towards it itself) 
becomes bound up with a list (Kauffman 1995: 159): a list of the 
disaffected and marginalized (a sometimes spectacularly colourful 
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rainbow coalition) or a list of grievances which do not cohere in any 
fundamental sense (unless racist sexist ageist homophobes-the list 
could and does go on-form a united bloc). Yet this list does speak to 
our times. Perhaps there is no real sense in getting all teary-eyed and 
nostalgic. as Eric Hobsbawm has done recently. about the demise of a 
universalist Left for which there is, arguably, no real structural 
foundation (Hobsbawm 1996: 38-47). This is not to say that 
universalism or the possibility of universalism has disappeared but 
rather that fractured identity politics reflects a fractured social life. 
Unless something dramatic happens to heal the fractures in social life, 
then a Leftist universalism becomes increasingly difficult to achieve. 
When real community, community founded upon a vibrant sense of 
place, is effectively shattered by suburbanization. superhighways and 
capital flight, when work and reSidence are not only separate but 
increasingly out of the reach of many people. when the fast pace of 
social change generates racist phobias more than worker resistance, 
particular issues and identities come to the fore politically and 
universalist visions and solutions recede. No amount of appealing to 
people's solidarity or good sense can overcome this dynamic, And the 
real problem is that, despite various attempts to establish rainbow 
coalitions, there is no automatic unity between the range (or list) of 
marginalized, disaffected and oppressed groups. Their agendas, 
necessarily, differ but their visions of a good society (if they have one) 
might be somewhat similar. And this is where universal visions and 
particular identities could coalesce-around a utopian vision. But so 
much of the project of the Left or progreSSive forces has dissipated into 
specific demands achievable under equal opportunity capitalism that 
a broader Vision becomes difficult to imagine. 
i So the particular and the universal remain divided-perhaps not 
permanently but until such times as the disparate threads of 
postmodern politics go beyond immediate demands and point towards 
the good society. Or, as Ernesto Laclau has put It: 'The assertion of 
one's own particularity requires the appeal of something transcending 
it' (Laclau 1995: 147). That is, for self-determination to be realized 
fully, it can only take place In a context which recognizes and gives 
legitimacy to others-this necessarily places some limits on the content 
of self-determination. While Hobsbawm has a point in asserting that 
'the nationalist claim that they are for everyone's right to self­
determination is bogus'. it Is nonetheless possible for different and. 
indeed, competing Identities to Inhabit the same terrain and extend 
tolerance (Hobsbawm 1996: 43). And this Is precisely where some 
general concept of community (something at least which transcends 
specific identity-based communities) needs to become central to Left 
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discourse. Just because the term has been appropriated by the Right 
and stripped ofmeaning, this does not automatically imply that it should 
be jettisoned. On the contrary, it must be rescued and Injected with 
new meaning. 
Community these days seems conceptually quaint. Many years have 
gone by since sociologists and historians battled about its precise 
definition. its location (as postmodernlsts might have it) in various 
theoretical schemata. Some abandoned the concept entirely, seeing it 
as fundamentally useless because of its lack of precision. Others, led 
by Craig Calhoun, defended its status. argUing that mUltiple definitions 
did not strip the term of legitimacy (Macfarlane 1977: 633; Calhoun 
1980: 105-29). If such debates seem arcane today it is because 
community is viewed either as a relic of New-Left struggles or a piece of 
populist nostalgia. The early New-Left focus on community over class 
has become hopelessly dated in a world of apparently free-floating 
identities. And populism also missed the boat, being overloaded with 
an 'unproblematized' notion of the people. Yet, arguably, the New Left 
still has something to offer and it is a peculiar form of amnesia which 
suggests otherwise. Moreover. some form of contemporary populism 
might provide the way to bring together particular and universal claims. 
The real danger with a Left populism is that it can end up repeating the 
New Right's allegations about big government. To that extent, it becomes 
but another episode In The X-Files (a SUitably postmodern politics, after 
all). Or populist rhetoriC can seek to overwhelm any claims to 
particularity, thus eliding race, gender and sexuality as speCific 
concerns. According to Hobsbawm, of course. this would be all to the 
good and, as already mentioned, his version of universality ends up 
with an appeal to the nation or what he calls 'citizen nationalism' 
(Hobsbawm 1996: 45). Clearly distraught as a consequence of recent 
woeful performances by England's cricket team, he retreats into the 
world ofthe nation. celebrating the 'common identity· to be found there. 
But a nation is not a community and jingOism, it seems to me, is the 
very worst sort of identity politics. Hobsbawm's Marxism has come 
adrift on the shoals of nationalism like so much Marxism beforehand. 
The universality of class no longer has resonance, so why not seek 
commonality elsewhere, in that which really transcends the individual, 
the group and the neighbourhood? But it must be stressed again that 
community is something more than commonality. It at least hints at 
(something which the nation does not do) the good society. And it can, 
as Laclau has suggested. uphold a universality which embraces 
particularities. Distinguishing between politics today and the politics 
of modernity with Its commitment to universality, Laclau notes: 
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[t]he starting point of contemporary social and political struggles 
is, on the contrary, the strong assertion of their particularity, the 
conviction that none of them Is capable, on its own, of bringing 
about the fullness of community. But precisely because of that. as 
we have seen, this particularity cannot be constructed through a 
pure 'politics of difference' but has to appeal, as the very condition 
of Its own assertion, to universal principles (Laclau 1995: 150). 
In other words, identity politics can either wallow in the limited 
certainties of Its internal politics (specifically gay, feminist or black 
demands, for instance) or can embrace some notion of the common 
good. To the extent that the common good is pursued, identity becomes 
less central but not necessarily marginal. The good society, after all, 
does not reqUire the obliteration of particular subcultures but. on the 
contrary, may thrive because of them. 
The common good can be perceived in a number of ways. It can 
refer to the accumulation of private interests and thus be a philosophical 
support for bourgeois society. Yet. as Marcus Raskin has pointed out, 
this is a severely truncated concept of common good (Raskin 1986: 23­
56). Only a concept which transcends class or group or regional 
allegiances can point towards democratic social change-because 
democracy, as Rousseau understood, was not the sum total of individual 
desires or wills but rather was propelled by a general desire or will. To 
some, this resonates with the ideology of fascism or totalitarianism. 
Yet it need not, if it is accepted that the general will is not predicated 
upon the destruction of individual desires or wills, that the public sphere 
is not reliant upon the destruction ofthe private sphere. On the contrary, 
a vibrant public sphere will Interact dialectically with a dynamic private 
sphere. Perhaps, to borrow an idea from Raskin, the whole delineation 
of public and private In capitalist society needs to be rethought. Feminist 
theory, in particular, has made at least some of the divisions between 
public and private appear increasingly artificial. At the moment, 
however, it Is vital for radicals to resist the valorization of the private 
(which is both the current dominant ideology and is also reflected by 
sections of the Left) and to defend the public sphere and public 
institutions from attack. In the long run, of course, we may want to 
reconstitute these public Institutions. ensuring their responsiveness 
to democratic desires. But in the long run we may also be left without 
any effective public institutions to defend. As the public sphere comes 
increasingly under pressure and attack, the whole question of ethics 
and social justice, public responsibility and the common good becomes 
ever more urgent. 
Within America, the identity of homelessness has failed to generate 
massive social resistance or even minimal civil disobedience. In the 
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array of postmodern capitalist choices, life without a home has little 
cultural capital. Yet David Harvey has suggested that 
{t]he identity of a homeless person is vital to their sense of selfhood 
... A political programme that successfully combats homelessness 
(or racism) has to face up to the real difficulty of a loss of identity 
on the part of those who have become victims of such forms of 
oppression (Harvey 1993: 64). 
He has a point. but so does Clinton in taking a leaf out of Charles 
Murray's work and moving to abolish welfare. Oppression and 
discrimination do facilitate the development of particular sorts of 
identities. Specific forms of oppression, however, are more likely to 
strip people of identity, personality, self-respect, clothes and shelter. 
Under certain conditions, we can confidently ignore the therapeutic 
babble which urges us tel respect each and every identity and celebrate 
all difference. Harvey is on surer ground when he suggests not all 'others' 
are equal-'some are more other than others'-and this requires critical 
assessment. some acceptance that one group's otherness may be a 
marginal concern in the overall political and economic context (Harvey 
1993: 63-4). Harvey, like Laclau, sees the need for universality and 
particularity to be in dynamic association. And this requires a fluid 
rather than static concept of community, one open to the pressures of 
a pluralist politics but not beholden to the machinations of interest 
groups. To the extent that identity politics conflicts with political 
citizenship, as Todd Gitlin argues, it will have to be transcended (Gitlin 
1995: 237). To the extent that community and social justice need to be 
pursued in creative and participatory ways, identities must be willing 
to be refashioned. The end of identity politics may mark the beginning 
of a politics of identity and community. 
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